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The premise of biological modularity is an ontological claim that appears to come out of
practice. We understand that the biological world is modular because we can manipulate
different parts of organisms in ways that would only work if there were discrete parts that
were interchangeable. This is the foundation of the BioBrick assembly method widely used
in synthetic biology. It is one of a number of methods that allows practitioners to construct
and reconstruct biological pathways and devices using DNA libraries of standardized parts
with known functions. In this paper, we investigate how the practice of synthetic biology
reconfigures biological understanding of the key concepts of modularity and evolvability.
We illustrate how this practice approach takes engineering knowledge and uses it to try to
understand biological organization by showing how the construction of functional parts
and processes can be used in synthetic experimental evolution. We introduce a new ap-
proach within synthetic biology that uses the premise of a parts-based ontology together
with that of organismal self-organization to optimize orthogonal metabolic pathways in E.
coli. We then use this and other examples to help characterize semisynthetic categories of
modularity, parthood, and evolvability within the discipline.
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Editorial introduction: Catherine Kendig and Todd Eckdahl defend and illustrate a prac-
tice-based view of metaphysics of science. The target of their paper is the emerging and fas-
cinating field of synthetic biology—a bioengineering domain that focuses on designing and
assembling biological entities. The challenge they discuss is the following: What happens,
ontologically-speaking, when as well as describing biological entities we start manufacturing
new ones?
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Kendig and Eckdahl examine the idea of modularity, which has long fascinated biologists,
especially in evolution and ‘evo-devo’ (i.e., the articulation between evolutionary and devel-
opmental biology). They suggest that modularity is underpinned by an ontological claim
about the living world. When we say that living things are ‘modular,’ we mean that they
possess discrete parts that can be interchangeable. For the authors, modularity is an instance
of a manipulation-based concept: the claim that a system is modular is in fact based on the
observation that when we manipulate that system, it behaves as if its parts were discrete
and interchangeable. Kendig and Eckdahl distinguish two concepts of modularity: ‘global
modularity’ and ‘local modularity,’ and insist that if global modularity describes a system as
modular, only local modularity can provide an explanation for the exact modularity the sys-
tem displays. Examining two recent methods in synthetic biology (the BioBrick Assembly
and the Golden Gate Assembly), they investigate how the practices of synthetic biology
lead to a re-conceptualization of modularity and evolvability (defined as the capacity to
change over time, by all sorts of natural, artificial, synthetic modifications).
This paper raises many critical metaphysical questions: What does it mean to ‘exist,’ and
should we believe only in the existence of what we canmanipulate? (This question, of course,
was vividly raised by Ian Hacking—e.g., in his 1981 “Do we see through a microscope?”—
but is made even more pressing with the rise of synthetic biology). How do we define
the ‘parts’ and the ‘whole’ in a system (see also Christopher Shields’s contribution to this
special issue)? Do engineered living beings belong to ‘natural kinds’? In addition to ‘in
silico’ systems (computer-based systems), can we use natural systems (such as bacteria) to
solve some of our problems, particularly optimization problems? Perhaps most importantly,
synthetic biology and bioengineering raise the following crucial questions: Is manipulability
a criterion of reality—and if so in what sense? –af/tp
Synthetic biology research is based on an underlying ontological premise (i.e. that the world
is structured in a certain way) that living organisms have an organization that is modular and
that the variation that natural selection acts upon can result from the recombining of modules.
The premise of biological modularity is an ontological claim that appears to come out of a prac-
tice. We understand that the biological world is modular because we can manipulate different
parts of organisms in ways that would only work if there were discrete parts that were inter-
changeable. This is the foundation of the BioBrick assembly method widely used in synthetic
biology (Knight 2003). It is one of a number of methods that allows practitioners to construct
and reconstruct biological pathways and devices using DNA libraries of standardized parts with
known functions (Brent 2004; Endy 2005). This construction and reconstruction, engineering
and reengineering can be understood to be a general thesis of biological modularity based in
practice. The parts database of biological modules with well-characterized functions relies on
this working hypothesis, and the success of synthetically produced networks and parts in prac-
tice seems to bear this out at least in some limited capacity. A common application of synthetic
biology is to manipulate the genetic control of metabolic pathways that either produce a useful
metabolite, such as a biofuel or a pharmaceutical or destroy an unwanted one, such as an en-
vironmental toxin. Metabolic pathways that occur naturally in the host cell are referred to as
‘native,’ while introduced pathways are called ‘orthogonal.’ Native pathways can be used to pro-
vide starting materials for orthogonal pathways. The aim for engineering host cell metabolism
is to integrate native and orthogonal metabolism.
In what follows, we investigate how the practice1 of synthetic biology may extend and shape
1For extended discussions of philosophy of science in practice see Hacking 1992, 1995; Dupré 1993;
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current discussion at the intersection of science and metaphysics by reconfiguring biological
understanding of the key concepts of modularity and evolvability.
1 Kinds of modularity
As a multidisciplinary field, synthetic biology draws from genetics, biochemistry, organic chem-
istry, molecular biology, cellular biology, and microbiology. Because of its mixed disciplinary
approach, it may be particularly well-suited to unpick the tangled meanings of concepts, such as
modularity, that have been long-debated within evolutionary and functional biology (see Mor-
ange 2009a, 374). The concepts of modularity, constraint, and convergence can be stripped down
and analysed and given functional parts-language descriptions through synthetic biological ex-
perimentation and manipulation of genomes of model organisms, such as that of the synthetic
biology workhorse, E. coli. In addition to these concepts Morange mentions at play within
synthetic biology in general, we suggest that the assembly methods used in metabolic engineer-
ing in particular can be used as an epistemic tool to also disentangle the multiple notions of
evolvability and fitness.
The property of modularity has been widely discussed. Despite its seeming ubiquity within
biological systems, what is inferred by the claim that an organism or biological system is modular
needs some unpacking in order to be used in practice (see especially Schlosser andWagner 2004;
Wagner et al. 2007). Although understood to be a central principle of functional biology and
synthetic biology, it is often described as a concept with multiple meanings. If this is the case,
can we simply admit that the best approach to modularity is one of pluralism? If pluralism works
for species concepts and gene concepts, why not modularity concepts?2 Sure, but this is not the
problem that we identify here. Instead, our aim is to show that there is a lack of recognition
that claims about modularity can belong to the category of modularity and there are claims that
belong to the individuating concepts of modularity. Conflating claims about the category of
modularity and those of individual concepts of modularity used to explain how the system is
modular causes confusion. Within the emerging discipline of synthetic biology, this apparent
ambiguity means that more than context is usually required for the use of the term to confer
knowledge about the system being described as modular from one practitioner to another. We
focus on a particular case and suggest the term ‘modularity’ is used to identify two different kinds
of claims in the metabolic engineering of parts and pathways within synthetic biology. In doing
so, we discriminate between what might be best described as the general philosophical claims
of the category of modularity as ‘global modularity’ and we use ‘local modularity’ to refer to the
more restricted claims of modularity that are set out within the separate operational concepts.
i. Global modularity (GM): A general category of properties of biological organization that
claims that parts, processes, and pathways are made up of relatively independent compo-
nents, like building blocks. This claim may take the form of a metaphysical category that
refers to the properties of organization of living things as modular; a claim that applies
with univocality to all biological structures included within it. It can be a methodolog-
ical heuristic; that the best way to proceed with research is to look for modularity. It
can be an epistemic heuristic, that the world is knowable and we gain understanding by
considering it is modularly organized. The category of GM has been referred to variously
Chang 2004; Rouse 2003; De Regt, Leonelli, and Eigner 2009; Soler 2012; Soler, Zwart, Lynch &
Israel-Jost 2014; and Kendig 2016.
2We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing to this problem.
 open access - ptpbio.org
kendig & eckdahl: reengineering metaphysics 4
in the synthetic biology literature in terms of definitions: “modules are … discrete enti-
ties, whose relatively autonomous functions are separable from those of other modules,
and designed so that interconnecting modules allow higher level functions to be built”
(Hartwell et al. 1999), and in terms of a concept: “[S]ynthetic biology begins with the
concept of modularity. A system can be described as modular if its components can be
functionally separated and recombined … this abstractability makes it possible to do re-
ductionist experiments in biology, isolating specific modules for close study to eliminate
variables introduced by the cellular context” (Agapakis and Silver 2009, 704–705).
ii. Local modularity (LM): A specific claim about the parthood of a particular organism,
pathway, device, or process. Local modularity is a restricted claim that refers to the do-
main specific properties of the object of concern and how they are integrated. It focuses
on the propert(ies) of being a part, the individuation of parts, and the composition of parts
as they relate to one another and to a particular whole. Included under this kind of claim
are various sub-characterizations, for instance: that parts are relatively autonomous, in-
terchangeable, independent of the context of other parts, carry out measurable functions,
standardizable, or are non-decomposable. These are also included in GM in terms of de-
scriptions of the general structure, but in LM techniques are provided to operationalize
the measurement and manipulation of the interchangeability, independence and auton-
omy of modules. LM has been conceived of in a variety of ways depending on the system
specified and the practitioners’ interests to answer the question of how a system is mod-
ular: “the study of how genetic components work together to integrate environmental
signals and effect a cellular response … determine[s] what topological arrangement of
regulatory modules can lead to a given behavior, often with strong analogy to electronic
signal processing units such as logic gates and feedback loops” (Agapakis and Silver 2009,
705), or in terms of how biological entities interact: “biological parts and processes …
are organized in a modular fashion where regulatory molecules form groups with many
interactions within a group and few interactions between groups” (Espinosa-Soto and
Wagner 2010).
These two forms frame different spaces of epistemological and ontological investigation. In
doing so, they configure the level of biological organization to which the theses of modularity
(GM or LM) apply, and to what they apply.
Within synthetic biology, GM is used to conceptually frame the system one is investigat-
ing. GM is based on conceptualizing the system as modular whilst LM provides practitioners
techniques by which to pursue their research goals (e.g., to make the system more modular and
therefore more useable). Membership of a system within the category GM provides the prac-
titioner a set of inferences based on heuristics of abstraction and standardization that inform
her way of looking at a system. For instance, knowing the system is GM allows her to focus
on parts with known functions that are stably expressed with minimal context sensitivity and
irrespective of the other parts connected to them or in certain cases irrespective of the chassis
organism used (see Andrianantoandro, Basu, Karig, andWeiss 2006). LM informs which engi-
neering practices should be used by licensing the kinds of inferences the practitioner can make
about the system under manipulation (Endy 2005).
1.1 Assembly methods affecting modularity
Synthetic biology is based on a general thesis of biological modularity (GM) (Knight 2003;
Morange 2009a). The parts database of biological modules with well-characterized functions
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relies on this working hypothesis and the success of synthetically produced networks and parts
in practice seems to bear this out at least in some limited capacity. In this section, we investigate
how the practice of synthetic biology reconfigures biological understanding ofGMand LM.We
investigate how the assembly method one uses may affect the general claims about the nature
of modularity of the parts, devices, and pathways.
The most commonly-used assembly method, BioBrick assembly, is based on the standard-
ization of basic parts with a prefix and a suffix (Knight 2003). Addition of these two short
DNA sequences to any DNA element results in a BioBrick. Two BioBricks can be ligated to-
gether in either order to construct a composite that is itself a BioBrick containing a prefix and
a suffix. The central concept that enables BioBrick assembly to work is that type II restriction
enzymes XbaI and SpeI produce compatible sticky ends. BioBrick assembly has been a popular
method from its inception. However, it is not without problems. BioBrick assembly depends
on purification of DNA fragments after gel electrophoresis, a time consuming method that is
sometimes challenging even for experienced research groups. The pairing of the DNA recogni-
tion sequences for XbaI and SpeI during ligation results in a mixed site that practitioners refer to
as a BioBrick scar. The scar is six DNA nucleotides in length and has a defined sequence. There
are applications in which the spacing between two parts must be smaller than six nucleotides
or when the BioBrick scar sequence confounds the function of a device. Another problem with
BioBrick assembly is that once ligated together, two BioBricks cannot be taken apart for use in
another construct. Assembled BioBricks are components that can no longer be swappable or
interchangeable. In this way, the generation of the scar during BioBrick assembly affects the
kinds of parts produced and their degree of modularity.
A newer method, Golden Gate Assembly (GGA) addresses several of the limitations of
BioBrick assembly (Weber et al. 2011). GGA is based on the function of type IIs enzymes,
such as BsaI, which bind to an asymmetrical DNA sequence and cut the DNA outside of the
binding site. Two DNA parts to be connected by GGA are engineered by the practitioner to
have BsaI restriction sites that produce complementary sticky ends. The DNA fragment on
the left has a BsaI site directed toward a sticky end while the DNA fragment on the right has
a BsaI site directed toward a complementary sticky end. The two DNA parts are mixed with
both BsaI and DNA ligase simultaneously under conditions that support both enzymes. Liga-
tion of the two DNA subparts results in an end product that contains no BsaI sites. GGA is
more automated than BioBrick assembly since digestion and ligation are combined into a single
reaction, avoiding purification of DNA fragments after gel electrophoresis. Another advantage
is that the nucleotide spacing between two parts connected by GGA can be zero nucleotides
rather than six nucleotides as in BioBrick assembly. Using GGA, parts have increased modu-
larity when compared to those produced by the BioBrick method. In practice, ‘modular’ means
something different for those using GGA than it does for those using BioBrick assembly.
GGA also has limitations. Because customized DNA primers must be designed and syn-
thesized for each part to be assembled during GGA, the level of standardization of GGA is
lower than it is for BioBrick assembly. GGA as originally described enables researchers to
introduce genetic variation into a construct using small or large libraries of parts that vary in
sequence and function, but not the reintroduction of variation into assembled constructs. This
is a problem for any practitioner interested in the reintroduction of variation into populations of
DNA constructs that have undergone functional selection. This approach is desirable because
it more closely resembles evolution by natural selection than does the one time introduction of
variation enabled byGGA. If the intention of the research is to make systems, devices, and path-
ways in synthetic biology that can be used to understand natural selection, then a newmethod is
 open access - ptpbio.org
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needed. Eckdahl et al. (2015) recently developed an adaptation of GGA called Junction GGA
( J-GGA) that standardizes assembly and enables the high throughput introduction and rein-
troduction of genetic variation into DNA constructs. J-GGA employs a scaffold with junction
sequences on each side of the parts within a gene expression cassette. The junctions enable the
use of standardized primers for use in assembly. Variation can be introduced into combinations
of genetic elements at the same time. J-GGA allows practitioners to introduce simultaneous
variation of a number of different genetic variables, including transcriptional promoters, origins
of replication that control plasmid copy number, ribosome binding sites, gene alleles, and pro-
tein degradation tags. Using J-GGA assembly, modularity both increases and is conceived of
differently in practice than it is using either the BioBrick or GGA methods.
1.2 Modularity and modularizing
Whilst GM refers to the category of modularity, LM refers to different theses of discrete part-
hood (either of which may pertain to processes, products, relationships, or properties), and in
particular, how biological systems, processes or pathways instantiate modularity.
When considering the different assembly methods BioBrick and GGA as described above,
we find a problem if ‘modularity’ is taken to only refer to GM. The problem arises because
it appears that knowledge of how a system is to be modular depends upon what techniques
one uses, for example, what assembly method one uses. The category of modularity and the
phenomenological state of being a module seems only to give us knowledge that the system
is modular but not how it is. To understand how it is modular depends upon bioengineering
practice. Being a module appears to not be defined in the GM category, e.g., in virtue of being
a member of the category of being modular, or membership in some class, or based on the
assumption that there are other properties that can be inferred from membership within the
category. This is a problem if GM is conflated with LM insofar as GM defines being modular as
something that is irrespective of the way in which modularity can be instantiated in a system or
of assembly or tools used to make modules, whereas LM provides a way of understanding how
modularity is instantiated.
The claim of LM is a claim specific to the compositional structure that parts and wholes
exemplify in a particular system. LM is an answer to questions like: What is the nature of parts
in that particular device or pathway? How are they organized? What is the relationship of the
compositional structure of them to the whole in question? It characterizes the property and
nature of modulehood in situ and so provides operational criteria that can be used to measure
modularity within a system. The things that are categorized as modular are numerous and may
come about due to differing processes of assembly or categorization. LM defines modules qua
modules in their individuation and identification as parts of the pathway, process, or mechanism
and in the satisfaction of a particular function or purpose. The assembly method used makes
parts into modules insofar as they are chosen by practitioners to be connected or separated
from other parts. What counts as a module (variously understood) and the criteria for modular
kindhood may not be the same for all modules. That is, for LM, modularity may not be a
property that can be univocally expressed for all parts.3
However, LM is not without problems. To say something is a module or part has typi-
cally meant that it bears some sameness relationship, family resemblance, or overlapping shared
homeostatic set of properties4 to another part quamodule. In this way, being a module—insofar
3In contrast, it is this universal claim that characterizes GM.
4Insofar as a module or part is something whose propert(ies) or relationship(s) are shared by other
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as it is understood to be a property—means that it is a property that is instantiable in one way.
This means that all modules insofar as they are modules are homogeneously so. Local module-
hood may be a kind differently instantiated. That is, modulehood for one thing may not be the
same as modulehood for another in a radical and non-comparative way. This may be perceived
a weakness of LM. Some might argue that this brings into question the legitimacy of what it is
that we refer to when we claim something is a module if there is no unifying claim (like there
is with GM). When faced with this proposition, some may prefer to dispense with all claims
of modularity and become eliminativists. Alternatively, they may embrace the heterogeneity
of local modulehood and allow that local modulehood may be a radically heterogeneous group
of concepts that may overlap across all kinds of metaphysically parcelled out stuff and be LM
pluralists while remaining GM monists. If GM and LM refer to different types of claims—
the former concerning the membership within a category and the latter a set of operational
concepts for investigation of part-whole relationships that inform our understanding about the
constituents of the universe—then they may both hold. One may retain the unifying category
of GMwhilst acknowledging that in LM, different assembly methods affect the degree of mod-
ularity and fungibility of parts such that what it is to be modular at the local level is variously
understood.
1.3 Description and explanation
To say of a particular system that it is a member of the category GM is to say something about
an abstract level of organization—that it is organized in some way so that it does whatever it
does stably (Schlosser and Wagner 2004, 519–522; Wuensche 2004, 307–312). That is, GM
licenses us to describe the system as having the property of modularity. LM provides a context
specific concept that provides information about which resources are needed to make a system
modular and how it is (or could be) modular or more modular. LM (unlike GM) provides a
determination of modulehood that involves pragmatic and normative constraints that can be
used to judge whether that thing (system process part) is modular or is not modular. Why is
this important? How the property of being a module or the determination that a system has
the nature of modulehood at a given time allows us to do things with it. If it is a module, and
we know in what way it is modular, we may potentially be able to build things with it. Its
being a module stands in a relation to us as practitioners in being a standardized part with a
known function given a particular set of conditions. Describing something as a module makes
something a resource for synthetic biology but it also provides us with a way of evaluating it
as a particularly useful or particularly un-useful resource, e.g., if the function attributed to the
standardized part is expressed reliably in a number of different systems—one that works in all
chassis, or one that works in E. coli as well as S. cerevisiae—it might be thought of as particularly
good.
Metabolic engineering relies on a part-whole relationship that is characterized in terms of
the design and construction of standardized biological parts into synthetic biological wholes
(Endy 2005). The standardization of parts is necessary to conceive of complex biological sys-
tems in ways that make these parts useable as tools for synthetic biology practitioners. But doing
so also relies on knowing the appropriate engineering practices necessary for the construction
of processes, devices, and mechanisms which in turn relies on understanding how a system is
modular. That there are modules is descriptive of a system, knowing how things are modular
things referred to as the same kind of part, the nature of parthood can be understood in terms of kindhood.
See Putnam (1975), in particular his use of the conception of a sameness relation, Wittgenstein’s (1953)
use of family resemblances, or Boyd’s (1991, 1999) homeostatic property cluster kinds.
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provides an explanation of its modularity. The latter requires investigation into the integration
within modules themselves as well as the integration (or nonintegration) between modules in
such a way that the system works (cf. Nandagopal and Elowitz 2011, 1244–1248). It makes
the concept of modularity useable by providing ways of measuring or tracking it in systems. For
instance, Del Vecchio et al. (2008) conceptualize modularity by relying on the notion of retroac-
tivity5 which they expand and operationalize in their clarification of the criteria for modularity.
For Del Vecchio et al., a system is made up of nodes where each node is considered retroactive
in so far as there is an effect on the upstream process that is caused (or effected) by a down-
stream process. Retroactivity can be measured for every node in the system or pathway (e.g., a
metabolite). In this way, nonmodularity and modularity are defined in terms of retroactivity
and the absence of retroactivity, respectively. A module can be identified as that node that does
not have reactivity and a node that does have reactivity is one that is not a module (Del Vecchio
et al. 2008).
Whereas GM offers a description of a system as modular, LM provides an explanation.
How a system instantiates the property of modularity means investigating how the different
parts cohere as modules and how they interact with other modules. This is dependent on how
these are individuated in respect to the normative, epistemic, and methodological constraints
that frame the role of the part as a module and frame it as a resource for synthetic biology
practitioners within a particular local concept of modularity. The cause of the modularity must
always be provided by the local conception that is specified in the context of the object to be
investigated and the investigator.
We might say that GM is of value as a heuristic to investigate the possibility of module-like
things. It might be conceived of as a necessary premise prior to further investigation—that
something may be a module or as a putative property of a system which may or may not turn
out to actually be modular. That is, it may frame research as being towards the goal of finding or
identifying a module. But if GM is of this kind of heuristic value, it might be because we infer
that if the system is modular, then it must be modular in a particular way. If one is thinking
in terms of a general approach that sees systems as modular, one may say what one is doing is
just thinking about things modularly. Within metabolic engineering, thinking about modules
doesn’t get us where we need to go. What we really want to do is to find them locally and know
how they work. LM is what allows the practitioner to uncover the techniques and resources by
which she can reengineer a system with success (knowing that the function of the module will
work in the chassis she chooses because it has worked in others reliably). But this knowledge
itself arises from manipulating the modules within the systems in a way that is productive or
towards that goal. It comes from practice. For instance, if what is sought is a way to make the
pathway stable, one might restrict the focus to those parts which the practitioner knows were
manipulable in the system in the last experiment. Doing this means that the kind of explanation
sought directs and is directed by the investigator.
Seeking a cause or a number of causes for why some system has the property of modular-
ity means deciding to focus on a particular set of causes that are believed to be informative for
a particular explanatory purpose whilst others are ignored (cf. Shaffer 2005). This is an old
problem—how do we decide what to include in our explanation from our knowledge in order
to answer the question we are asking in a way that is explanatorily salient? (see Kitcher 1981;
van Fraassen 1980; Waters 2007; Oftedal and Parkkinen 2013). Oftedal and Parkkinen (2007)
suggest that this problem is even worse in synthetic biology because rather than just looking for
causal explanations of biological systems that exist and are there to be investigated, practitioners
5Retroactivity is a concept introduced by Saez-Rodriguez et al. 2005.
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are constructing the phenomena (and the explanandum) that they are seeking to explain. That is,
practitioners “manipulate[e] biological systems, building on the explanatory resources available
for understanding them” (Oftedal and Parkkinen 2013, 212). Practitioners frame an explanan-
dum within a system of practice where parts are constructed in a controlled environment and
where causal stability is both maintained and sought—doing so directs the kind of engineering
practices and methods used to reengineer the metabolic pathway and may lead to understand-
ing of the system that provides explanatory resources for future manipulation. We conclude
with the suggestion that the concepts of modularity used within LM shape the questions being
asked about the modularity of systems as well as the resources used to answer them. LM defines
parts, the relationship of parts to other parts within the modular system and the relationship
of modules to other modules (e.g., their interreactivity within a system of modules). What a
module is, is in some way always a ‘module-for’ in two senses—it is a module that functions in
a particular way given the system of investigation, and it is a module that is defined in terms of
the investigator who uses it and her interests and goals in its use.
2 How CanModularity Help Facilitate Evolvability?
Wemove now from mapping out some of the conceptual terrain of modularity within synthetic
biology to that of evolvability. What is evolvability? We think of natural organisms as evolv-
able in terms of their ability to adapt and one of the factors that facilitates this adaptability is
thought to be the ubiquity of modular networks. As such, many define what it is to be a module
in terms of its evolvability, as a “semi-autonomous entity that evolves, functions or participates
in development (or other processes) relatively independently from other modules” (Espinosa-
Soto and Wagner 2010, 1). But how or why modularity evolved remains an open question
(see especially Clune et al. 2013). Some argue that modularity is a property that emerges as a
side effect, or byproduct, of evolution: “modularity can increase in gene regulatory networks as
a byproduct of specialization in gene activity” (Espinosa-Soto and Wagner 2010, 1). Whilst
others argue that it drives phenotypic variation: “Modular organization is a universal property
of phenotypes, the result of the universally branching nature of development. Switches divide
the phenotype into somewhat discrete and semidissociable subunits of structure and gene ex-
pression or gene product use at all levels of organization” (West-Eberhard 2003, 56). One of
the most influential accounts of the role modularity plays in evolution focuses on this notion of
dissociability. Dissociability is a property that facilitates variation through compartmentation
where compartmentation is understood to be some degree of individualization (Kirschner and
Gerhart 1998, 2005). On this view, modularity is central to facilitated variation by allowing sys-
tems the capacity to maintain modular function in one area whilst making changes that do not
have upstream effects. As a property of a system that affords evolvability it has also been more
recently described as the property of near-decomposability (Wimsatt 2009) and semi-autonomy
(Espinosa-Soto andWagner 2010). But how exactly can modularity help facilitate evolvability?
Weak linkage between modules allows one feature of the system to dissociate from it and may
then be used in association with a different trait. This ‘reconfigurability’ of modular features
(as subunits of traits) constitutes a highly conserved core capacity of organisms (Kirschner and
Gerhart 2005, 136). As such, it furnishes the possibility of dissociating these modular units and
their subsequent rearrangement into novel combinations by the biological system to serve other
purposes. The compartmentalization of the component parts of an organism into relatively dis-
crete units or subunits means that the effects of variations in one subunit may be isolated from
those of another (see Kirschner and Gerhart 2005). If these are, in turn, inherited as subunits,
 open access - ptpbio.org
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the modularity of the organism may increase over generations.
2.1 Engineering evolvability
How can evolvability be characterized in synthetic biology?6 We suggest that it may be best
understood as the capacity of a population, organism, device, part, or pathway to change over
time—that is, evolvability is the retained space of variability of self-organized systems. Facil-
itated variation can then be understood to be the organization and reorganization of modular
parts necessary for evolvability more generally. On this view, modularity is a property of both
engineered and native systems for the same reason. If a biological system is modular, it is able to
make changes in downstream nodes without effects upstream, so change can occur in one area
without affecting the whole metabolic pathway and the system (or the practitioner) can utilize
resources in new combinatorial strategies. Conceived of in this way, it can serve as an umbrella
term under which natural, artificial, and synthetic change over time can be covered.
In the remaining sections, we discuss the problem of natural selection formetabolic engineer-
ing and a possible solution. The solution relies on a particular example of metabolic engineering,
its potential for harnessing evolvability in synthetic biology, and conceptual consideration of it
as a new mechanism of evolvability pertinent to the practice of synthetic biology. We consider
whether evolvability can be engineered and how we might categorize these (and other) kinds of
evolutionary change within synthetic biology. In particular, we suggest that investigating the
methods and practices of knowledge acquisition within synthetic biology presents an alterna-
tive way of exploring metaphysical questions within philosophy such as: What are the kinds
of things and processes that exist and the scientific categories to which they belong? What is
the relationship between parts and wholes? It also introduces new questions about what it is
to be a part or indeed the property of partness itself; questions whose answers seem to rely on
understanding the metaphysics of science as grounded in the actual practice of it. We suggest
a categorization of the products of some of these methods as semisynthetic7 to mark these out
as new routes of the evolution of novelty and innovation that are the result of combined native
and orthogonal pathways.
2.2 Current research and applications
To explain the potential for harnessing evolvability within metabolic engineering, we need to
refer actual examples of this and outline the kinds of processes involved in the reengineering of
metabolic pathways. We begin by briefly describing a series of recent studies focusing on the
metabolic engineering of yeast cells for production of plant-derived metabolites (DeLoache et
al. 2015) before discussing the problems of optimization and natural selection that arise for this
and other studies (see Table 1) focused on metabolic engineering. DeLoache et al. sought a way
to engineer yeast cells to produce pharmaceuticals in a chemical family called benzylisoquinoline
alkaloids (BIAs). BIAs include the analgesics morphine and codeine, the antibiotics sanguinar-
ine and berberine, the muscle relaxants tubocurarine and papaverine and the cough suppressant
6For a recent discussion of evolvability and synthetic engineering that is complementary to the one
presented here, see Calcott 2014).
7We introduce the neologism of ‘semisynthetic evolution.’ We believe that this is a justified and appro-
priate descriptor as the evolution described arises in part due to the manipulation by synthetic biologists
and in part through (non-human) selective forces. It is hoped that this classification will highlight the
potential role for discussion of different kinds of evolution due to the different causal mechanisms by
which they occur
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Table 1: Modes of development and aspects of organization to which stem cells contribute.
Host Organism Metabolite Application Reference
Yeast Artemisinin Anti-malarial drug Martin et al. 2003
E. coli organic acids Chemical commodities Yu et al. 2011
E. coli Isobutyl alcohol Biofuels Atsumi et al. 2008
Bacterial consortium Copper Bioremediation Brune, Bayer 2012
noscapine. Extensive research on the production of BIAs in plants such as the opium poppy
yielded information about the native metabolism, genes involved, enzymes they encode, and
the metabolic pathways they control. Efforts to engineer E. coli for BIA synthesis led to the
production of the intermediate metabolite (S)-reticuline in a combined native and orthogonal
pathway but failed to produce BIAs in downstream metabolic steps. The engineering of yeast
cells able to carry out these downstream steps indicated that eukaryotic yeast cells may be bet-
ter equipped for BIA metabolic engineering than prokaryotic E. coli cells. Understanding the
native metabolism, this makes sense considering that naturally occurring BIA synthesis occurs
in eukaryotic plants.
Although some BIAs have been produced by coculturingE. coli for (S)-reticuline production
with yeast for BIA synthesis, this strategy does not scale well for industrial pharmaceutical set-
tings. In response, DeLoache et al. sought to engineer the production in yeast of (S)-reticuline
using orthogonal downstream metabolic steps to produce BIAs. The group directed the protein
evolution of a key enzyme in the pathway to (S)-reticuline by introducing mutations into the
gene coding for the enzyme and screened for a mutant enzyme that functioned with high ef-
ficiency. They were able to use the mutant enzyme to complete a seven step pathway in yeast
from the simple sugar glucose to (S)-reticuline. Their result affords the opportunity to com-
bine the metabolic steps leading to (S)-reticuline with those already demonstrated to convert
(S)-reticuline to BIAs. Doing so would suggest both the feasibility of using microbes and the
possible utility of metabolic engineering of yeast cells to produce valuable BIAs.
Table 1 shows four other examples of microbial metabolic engineering. The most high pro-
file example resulted in yeast cells that produce the anti-malarial drug artemisinin, reducing
its cost of production compared to purification from the sweet wormwood plant (Martin 2003).
Metabolic engineering ofE. coli enabled the production of succinic acid, lactic acid, and glucaric
acid as chemical commodities (Yu et al. 2011) and isobutyl alcohol as a biofuel. A bioremedia-
tion application involved the recovery of copper using a consortium of metabolically engineered
bacteria.
2.3 Two problems: optimization and natural selection
Despite the successful reengineering of yeast cells to produce (S)-reticuline (DeLoache et al.
2015) and in the production of the anti-malarial drug artemisinin (Martin et al. 2003); E. coli
enabled to produce of succinic acid, lactic acid, and glucaric acid as chemical commodities (Yu
2011); and consortia of bacteria for bioremediation (Brune and Bayer 2012; see Table 1), two
problems keep arising. We will refer to the first of these as the optimization problem: How can
synthetic biologists optimize orthogonal metabolic output when they cannot know all of the
variables that affect it in a host organism and its environment? We call the second problem
the natural selection problem: How can the reduction in fitness in a population of organisms
engineered for an orthogonal metabolic pathway be prevented from causing evolution away
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from the desired metabolic output phenotype?
The native metabolism of all organisms is responsive to a vast array of internal and external
variables including genotype, metabolite availability, pH, osmotic pressure, and temperature.
When synthetic biologists introduce orthogonal metabolism into a host organism, they can
optimize metabolic output by taking into account the variables they know, but must ignore all
of the variables they don’t know and some that they cannot know. Practitioners also struggle
with the difficulty of trying to make sure that the organisms they engineer with the ability to
carry out orthogonal metabolism continue to faithfully replicate that genetic capacity. If the
production of the product or the maintenance of the pathway is too onerous for the cell, the
metabolic pathway will (after a number of generations) be disposed of. Those organisms without
the onerously produced product or taxing pathway will be selected for in preference to those
constructed to function by the synthetic biologist.
To address the optimization problem, practitioners have typically relied on what is called a
“rational approach” (Boyle and Silver 2012). This approach aims to optimize a metabolic path-
way by using knowledge of cellular (e.g., bacterial) physiology. Insofar as our understanding
of bacterial physiology and the effects of synthetically constructed pathways within E. coli or
another biological chassis is limited, so too are the efforts to constrain the pathway in light
of unknown (or perhaps unknowable) variables that may affect the output of a particular engi-
neered metabolic pathway. This problem-solving approach of the introduction of orthogonal
metabolism, measurement of metabolic output, and tweaking of pathways to improve output
has been the standard approach to the optimization problem.
An alternative to the rational approach is the peculiarly named “rationally irrational ap-
proach” (Boyle and Silver 2012). Whereas the rational approach meant attempting to use know
variables to reason an optimal combination of genetic elements controlling metabolism, the ra-
tionally irrational approach means using selection to solve the optimization problem. The ratio-
nally irrational approach takes into account the known variables as well as the unknown variables
at play in the regulation of orthogonal metabolic pathways. These variables include extracellu-
lar and intracellular pH, osmolarity of the media, stress caused by orthogonal metabolism and
endogenous metabolic flux. The effects that they have on orthogonal metabolism are difficult
to control.
Recently, Eckdahl et al. (2015) employed the rationally irrational approach in what they re-
fer to as ‘programmed evolution,’ utilizing a different kind of computation to traditional silicon-
based computation. Their strategy takes the heritable space of variability of self-organized sys-
tems and uses it to try to resolve the as-yet intractable problem of natural selection described
at the beginning of this section.8 Their programmed evolution abstracts bacterial cells as living
computers capable of taking many chemical and physical inputs and processing them with gene
expression algorithms to regulate their metabolism. It uses bacterial computers to compute so-
lutions to a metabolic optimization problem chosen by the practitioners. Cells are programmed
with variation in genetic control elements that control the gene expression required for the de-
sired metabolic pathway. The bacteria acquire inputs that are unknown to the researchers. The
bacteria will process all of this information as living analog computers, using the results to di-
rect the operation of their biochemical hardware. Eckdahl et al. justify their motivation for
using bacteria to do this computing by suggesting that bacteria are better informed and more
capable of making these calculations than people and the silicon computers they program with
incomplete information and models. Optimization of the metabolic pathway is achieved by the
8Although distinct, A. Wagner’s 2011 approach to evolutionary innovation as an exploration of a
space of possibilities is similar to that used by Eckdahl et al. 2015.
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bacterial population through natural selection. Once genetic variation is introduced into the
bacterial population, selection is imposed on it. Fitness is defined by the ability to produce the
most of the desired metabolic product. After selection, the allele frequency in the population
will have changed, effecting evolution of the bacterial population. Successive cycles of genetic
variation and selection cause the population to continue to evolve. Repeated generations of
evolution are expected to lead to increased optimization of the metabolic pathway. Coupling fit-
ness to optimal metabolic output also prevents the population from evolving away from optimal
product formation.
Before addressing the hard question of how evolvability and modularity are connected, we
make the provisional suggestion that one way evolvability and modularity can be connected is in
terms of this coupling of fitness to optimize metabolic output. Reengineering the retained space
of possible variability for this purpose—as the work of DeLoache et al. (2015) and Eckdahl et
al. (2015) shows—harnesses the power of self-organizing systems. In doing so these approaches
to metabolic engineering direct or program evolution by using natural selection itself to solve
the selection problem by co-opting the problem-solving and computing abilities inherent in
the bacterial population that is the object of study. That is, it enables researchers to program
bacteria and use evolution to compute the optimal combination of genetic control elements that
maximizes metabolic output and to maintain it in a population of cells.
The aim of synthetic biology in this mode is to allow the bacteria themselves to identify
properties of the system that increase their evolvability by facilitating their own variation given
certain inputs from practitioners. Bacteria are the ones able to combine resources in the best way
to optimize the metabolic pathway. Rather than use silicon-based computers and software to
compute the best functionality and evolvability of the biological system, programmed evolution
uses bacterial computers to solve the optimization problems.
This research shows that the introduction of genetic variation into a synthetic biology chassis
organism and imposition of user-defined selection to optimize an orthogonal metabolic pathway
are possible. In doing so, it seems to suggest a generalizable method. This new method allows
researchers to input a large number of variables rather than single variations. In doing so, it repli-
cates something that approximates native evolution. The result is a unified native-orthogonal
method that aims to solve—rather than offering a disjointed number of orthogonal solutions—
the optimization of metabolic pathways. It does so by allowing bacterial cells to do the heavy
lifting (and intentional construction) for themselves by taking into account the variables that
are unknown to the researcher. E. coli are allowed to solve the problem of using a variety of
chemical and physical inputs together with a gene expression algorithm to regulate their bio-
chemical hardware. The rationally irrational approach is used to employ natural selection in the
optimization of orthogonal metabolic pathways by coupling metabolic output to cellular fitness.
Bacterial cells use chemical and physical inputs (provided by the practitioners) and process them
in a way that is optimal given certain fitness constraints. For instance, Eckdahl et al. (2015) em-
ployed E. coli to optimize a metabolic pathway for the conversion of caffeine to theophylline.
Twenty-four strains were constructed that carried combinations of multiple genotypic variables.
These included the strength of the promoter, the ribosomal binding site, plasmid copy number,
and chaperone proteins. Fitness was linked to theophylline production by using a theophylline
riboswitch and a tetracycline resistance protein. This allowed researchers to measure change in
the distribution of the various twenty-four genotypes within the E. coli population (Eckdahl et
al. 2015).
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3 What Is the Connection Between Evolvability andModularity?
In the foregoing sections, we suggested that the methods that are used within synthetic biology
affect certain properties of biological systems, namely modularity and evolvability. But we have
not addressed a hard question—what is the connection between modularity and evolvability?
Evolvability of systems may (in some but not in all cases) be affected by the kind of modularity
that is exhibited or constructed within the system. Our remaining discussion focuses on how
the properties of an organism affect the changes in its metabolic pathway over time. It provides
a unique set of justifications for exploring engineering practices within synthetic biology that
may reveal the nature of modularity and evolvability. It is hoped that these will complement the
work of Karthik Raman and Andreas Wagner (2011) on the programmability of digital circuits
and their evolvability over time.9
If modularity can be conceived of in terms of either GM or LM (or both) in metabolic
engineering, what is the connection between evolvability and modularity? We suggest that
the answer to this question relies on the identification of which parts or pathways have con-
served tinkerability. ‘Tinkerability’ can be understood as the property of biological parts that
makes them better suited to repeated modifications over generations. Biological parts acquire
the property of tinkerability either through the process of evolution (following Jacob 1977), or
through the repeated manipulation by engineers. If tinkerability is a property that is conserved
over generations, it is a prerequisite of evolvability. That is, its retention is itself a property
of evolvability (cf. Foote and Yoder 2000, discussion on software design). Evolvability is an
evolved property, but how it evolves modularity is a question pursued both within synthetic
biology and outside of it (Clune et al. 2013). Modularity is one structure (but not the only one)
that evolvability is manifest in biological systems. So the answer to the question: what is the
connection between evolvability and modularity? Is: modularity is a property that affects how
metabolism can change over time and throughout a lineage. It provides (either by the organ-
ism or the engineer, or in the cases we have discussed, both) multiple ways of optimizing the
metabolic pathway.
4 Is semisynthetic evolvability still evolvability?
We return now to discuss evolvability. Earlier we suggested that evolvability may be understood
as the capacity of an organism, device, part, or pathway to change over time—that evolvability
is the heritable retained space of variability of self-organized systems. Conceived of in this
way, evolvability was able to be used as an umbrella concept under which natural, artificial, and
synthetic change over time can be covered. We now want to question the legitimacy of this as
a category or kind in practice.
Synthetic biological research, as well as the products and processes that it creates, sits in a lim-
inal position between engineered technological kinds and natural biological kinds (see Schyfter
2012). This has been seen as a difficult or messy position to be in with regard to kindhood
and discipline-building insofar as that to which a discipline focuses its research and questions
on is delimited by the kinds that define it. The notion that we have outlined in the foregoing
discussion of conserved spaces of variability and programmed evolution—that evolvability is
something that can be engineered and modified—has typically been dismissed as a category
9See also Wagner 2011 for the use of engineering metaphors in the investigation of evolutionary
systems biology and Calcott et al. 2015; Kashtan and Alon 2005; Foote and Yoder 2000 for more on
evolvability and modularity.
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mistake:
evolvability [is] not just a feature that can be added to the list of other technical
specifications, because [it] constitutes[s] an undefined dynamic challenge that pre-
cisely forbids the application of the methods of design and implementation that
engineers have practised so far (Marlière 2009, 83).
We challenge this. The recent study of programmed evolution and other research using a “ratio-
nally irrational approach” (Boyle and Silver 2012) suggests that evolvability is something that
not only can be engineered andmodified, but it has been engineered andmodified. Insofar as the
engineering is partially done in-house by the bacteria themselves, this may constitute a Gestalt
switch in engineering practice and design. Both the practice and product of programmed evo-
lution can perhaps be accurately referred to as ‘hybrid,’ or as we’ve suggested, ‘semisynthetic’
category.
Looking back to the various kinds of synthetic biology research and their concomitant episte-
mological categories, the rationally irrational approach and the co-opting of bacterial computing
to optimize metabolic pathways brings forward a new category of synthetic biology investiga-
tion. It is similar to protocell creation (O’Malley et al. 2008) in seeking to understand the
process of evolution, biological organization, and the nature of modularity and evolvability.10
But the goal of understanding this process is directed to the potential to modify and optimize
the modules, networks and systems which direct it. It takes evolvability to be a capacity that
can be defined, represented, measured, intervened upon and optimized by harnessing bacterial
populations as biological computers. Semisynthetic evolvability is the change over time of ratio-
nally irrational engineered populations. It differs from native or orthogonal evolvability in that
the synthetic biologist actively intervenes in the process of variation and employs the use of a
suite of constructed parts and employs populations of organisms to solve the biological problem
of optimization.
But are semisynthetic evolvability and the umbrella conception of evolvability legitimate
and veridical categories of evolvability? And how are we to judge them to be so? According to
Morange, “Selection in nature and evolution directed by biochemists and molecular biologists
increasingly differ as technological progress is made in synthetic biology” (Morange 2009a, 370).
At first blush, this would suggest that our semisynthetic evolvability may not count as evolution
at all. Later on, however, Morange provides an alternative account. He argues against his initial
suggestion that synthetically tweaked evolution does not count as evolution. He goes on to argue
that current understanding of evolution is based on an unwarranted assumption of univocalism
that could be challenged by findings in synthetic biology:
some of the extraordinary scenarios of evolution, designed by synthetic biologists,
must be carefully considered by evolutionary biologists. Maybe the models pro-
vided by evolutionary biologists are too restrictive, leaving too much place to uni-
formitarianism, the hypothesis that the mechanisms of evolution have always re-
mained the same (Morange 2009a, 374).
Put another way, perhaps evolutionary biologists have just been getting it wrong. Native evolv-
ability is actually more like our semisynthetic evolvability. So research into the latter may yield
understanding of the former. Judged according to Morange’s second suggestion, our umbrella
category of evolvability can also be viewed as veridical insofar as it captures the heterogeneity of
10See O’Malley et al. 2008 for a discussion of the categories of knowledge-making in synthetic biology,
one of which they refer to as “protocell creation.”
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synthetic, artificial, and natural evolutionary mechanisms as well as their concomitant epistemic
categories.
5 Modulehood as a Property of Agent-Centered Artifacts
The objects of synthetic biological investigation and manipulation are living systems. It appears
to be a discipline for which the functional devices, parts and pathways, the engineering practices,
and the epistemological and ontological categories to which they belong are transforming. So,
what can we say about the nature of these categories? What are synthetic biological kinds? and,
What kinds of kinds are the kinds within the discipline of synthetic biology? Schyfter (2012)
suggests what he calls an initial “exploration into things and kinds” offering a “first look analysis”
of kindhood for the products of synthetic biology and suggests that they fit imperfectly within
both technological kinds and natural biological kinds.11 He is critical of synthetic biologists for
not considering kindhood and for using engineering as the model and exemplar on which to
base synthetic biology. We suggest that the imperfect fit of the products of synthetic biology is
because that which is kinded is heterogeneous. If synthetic biology provides knowledge of how
systems work, then the explanations of nature it provides (e.g., about how to re-engineer and
manipulate them; cf. Sprinzak and Elowitz 2005; Keller 2009) suggest that it may be more prof-
itably conceived of as a discipline that is epistemologically, ontologically, and methodologically
hybrid. Semisynthetic kinds can be simply understood as hybrid organisms, parts, pathways,
devices, or modules that are partially the result of natural selection and partially the result of
engineered manipulation.
Instead of seeking to understand the use of epistemological and ontological categories in
practice from the premise that their existence can be known a priori or contained within the
theoretical framework of the discipline that uses them, this approach runs in the opposite di-
rection. Categories come into being in practice and from these categories-in-use theoretical
concepts, notions of causal directionality, functional architectures, and other relata arise (see
Kendig 2016b for an extended discussion of how these categories arise in synthetic biology).
A weak version of this approach that explicitly focuses on practice connects knowledge with its
concomitant mode of research. Practice is ineliminable. It does more than shape knowledge, the
practice of reengineering or making is knowing (Keller 2009, 377). A (problematically) strong
view of this would hold that theoretical concepts do not underpin and are not prerequisite to
empirical investigation. They follow rather than precede it.12
6 Conclusion
In the foregoing, we aimed to extend philosophical discussion within synthetic biology by fo-
cusing on the study and investigative practices used within it and on how practices in metabolic
engineering might suggest new approaches to the concepts of modularity and evolvability. Re-
ferring to a series of recent studies, we investigated the methods of assembly used and the evolu-
11Schyfter (2012) considers and evaluates the appropriateness of conceiving the products of synthetic
biological research as kinds of technological objects. Our discussion differs from his insofar as we take a
practice-based account of kinds that focuses on kinds of modules.
12Reference to Richard Feynman’s “what I cannot create, I do not understand” may seem appropriate
here. However, many have carefully pointed out that Feynman’s views about knowledge were largely
inconsistent with the typical reading of what is often referred to as the ‘chalkboard quote’ and so taking
it as exemplar to his thinking is problematic (O’Malley 2009; Keller 2009).
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tionary mechanisms retooled to overcome natural selection against metabolically reengineered
systems once made. We concluded by suggesting the potential need for new categories of modu-
larity and evolvability. What has been left out of the present discussion is role of the practitioner.
We suggest this as a potential area of further research. One way to carve up semisynthetic kinds
as kinds that are partially engineered technological kinds and partially natural biological kinds
is to take modulehood to be a property of agent-centered artifacts. Semisynthetic kinds, such as
the engineered pathways and processes discussed in the above, is to consider them as objects that
are used for practical purposes (see Houkes and Vermaas 2013; for criticisms see Longy 2013).
Taking an agent-centered approach, the individuation of modules as modules would be under-
stood as relying on shared agency of the community of practitioners, knowledge of affordances
or capacities, and the well-defined functions of parts, pathways, processes, and mechanisms that
are considered potential resources to be used in the design of a new device. In this way, local
modularity rests—at least in part—on the values of the practitioners and their intentions. Some
might suggest that this amounts to a rejection of semisynthetic kinds as natural or even as semi-
natural kinds. We suggest that the intentional categories of practitioners are natural insofar as
they partially individuate the etiological function of the engineered device under construction.
In doing so, the engineer normatively constrains the function of the device.
So what about GM? Some might argue that GM doesn’t really do anything for us as it
doesn’t inform practice and so calling attention to the lack of recognition between the category
of modularity and how it works might be met with the response, so what? So, what are GM
and LM doing for us? GM provides us with a heuristic claim of modularity (that a system
is modular). LM provides a means of addressing two separate but overlapping questions: the
question of why modularity exists—e.g., the ubiquity of modularity as explanandum (why does
it happen, what’s it for?), and modularity as an explanans in how it leads to evolution (or as some
suggest, how it emerges from evolution). The role of GM and LM in synthetic biology can be
understood as a mode of thinking that allows us to conceive and measure a system as potentially
decomposable and re-orderable relying on the decomposability perspective which works best for
that system. In some sense this can be understood to be the implementation of different notions
of what could be referred to as ‘reductionisms-in-practice,’ which refer to the different possible
ways of partitioning wholes into parts (Wimsatt 2009, 159–312). Reductionisms-in-practice
characterize the system in terms of different conditions modes of organizational independence.
Each yield “an approximate and adjustable framework [that allows] one to construct orderings
for howwell each condition [of invariance] is met… across different decompositions of a system
into parts … the better a decomposition meets these conditions, the more nearly it factors the
system intomodular parts that can be characterized from that perspective into terms of monadic,
intrinsic, or context-independent properties” (Wimsatt 2009, 176). Our approach explains why
these partitionings of the system work in terms of LM concepts and how these concepts are
based in and are shaped by practice. It is through iterative experimental practices that synthetic
biology practitioners reengineer both metabolic modular devices, but also the operational and
normative constraints necessary to make sense of why and how the system is modular. These
provide further adjustments and valuations of the usability of modules for their particular goal-
directed purpose, inform future investigations, and explain the nature of modularity within that
system.
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